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Introduction 
The	 notion	 of	 autonomy	—	for	 which	 the	 term	 “self-legislation”1	 is	
also	 used	—	is	 central	 both	 to	 Kant’s	 ethics	 and	 to	 most	 contempo-
rary	versions	of	Kantian	ethics.	According	to	a	widespread	view,	Kant	





Kant	claims	 that	our will	gives	 the	Moral	Law	 to itself.	This	 standard	
reading	is	shared	by	“constructivist”	and	“realist”	readers	of	Kant	alike.	





































1. The “Kantian Paradox”
1.1. Current interpretations and associated difficulties
Leading	interpreters	describe	Kant	as	claiming	that	the	Moral	Law	is	















example,	writes	 that	 “Kant	sees	 the	significance	of	autonomy	 in	 the	












premise.	 It	 is	 taken	for	granted	that	Kant	says	that	the	Moral	Law	is	
self-legislated.	
In	this	paper,	we	would	like	to	challenge	this	standard	reading	on	
both	 textual	and	philosophical	grounds.	We	argue	 for	 the	 following	














































less	 character	 of	 autonomy,	 the	harder	 it	 is	 to	make	 literal	 sense	of	
self-legislation	as	an	act	or	activity of	the	will.	Allen	Wood	articulates	
a	view	held	by	many	when	he	writes	that	there	is	a	“serious	tension	
in	 the	 idea	of	Kantian	 autonomy”	because	 the	 idea	 that	 rational	be-
ings	are	themselves	legislators	of	the	Moral	Law	and	the	idea	that	the	
Moral	Law	 is	objectively	binding	pull	 in	opposite	directions	 (Wood	
2008,	106).
In	 their	 attempt	 to	make	 sense	 of	 Kant’s	 discussion	 of	moral	 au-
















who	 are	 critical	 of	 Kant’s	 account	 of	 morality	—	particularly	 those	
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What	 each	 of	 these	 three	 interpretive	 proposals	 preserves	 is	 the	
idea	that	reason	is	 the	source	of	both	the	content	and	the	obligatory	















What	 is	 overlooked	on	 this	 line	of	 reasoning	 is	 that	 the	binding	
force	of	 the	Moral	 Law	 can	be	non-heteronomous	 in	origin	without 




since	Kant	 identifies	 the	will	with	practical	 reason,	a	 fundamental	a	
priori	principle	of	 the	will).	 If	 the	Moral	Law	is	an	a	priori	principle	
of	 practical	 reason	 itself,	 the	 obligatory	 force	 of	which	we	 come	 to	
acknowledge	in	practical	deliberation,	this	suffices	to	account	for	its	
example,	 interprets	Kant’s	notion	of	 autonomy	as	 an	 individual	 and	 social	
goal	to	be	realized	through	adherence	to	the	Categorical	Imperative,	namely	
as	a	condition	in	which	individual	and	collective	freedom	is	possible	to	the	
















nal	volition	(or	practical	 reason)	supplies	 its	own	 internal	or	 formal	
principle”	(i.e.,	the	Categorical	Imperative).	The	“element	of	activity”,	
of	“giving	law”,	he	adds,	amounts	to	the	fact	that	“subjects	engaged	in	





A	 third	strategy	 is	 to	point	out	 that	 there	are	several	passages	 in	
which	Kant	writes	that	we	should	“view”	or	“regard”	ourselves	as	self-
legislating.	On	this	basis,	Allen	Wood	suggests	that	we	do	best	to	treat	







namely	 as	 a	 law-giving	 “of	 its	 own	kind”,	which,	he	 argues,	 expresses	 that	
the	Categorical	Imperative	is	“unconditioned	by	foreign	determinants”	(2013,	
269–70).
9.	 Some	 of	 those	 who	 read	 Kant	 as	 defending	 a	 realist	 position	 also	 de-em-
phasize	 the	 “legislation”	aspect	 in	 the	notion	of	autonomy.	Paul	Guyer,	 for	
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supreme	 principle	 of	 morality”	 (G	 4:440),	 all	 in	 Groundwork II;	 his	
identification	of	freedom	of	the	will	and	autonomy	at	the	beginning	of	




2. An Alternative Reading of Kant’s Conception of Moral Autonomy
2.1. Kant’s introduction of autonomy in Groundwork II
In	 the	 Groundwork,	 Kant	 introduces	 the	 notion	 of	 autonomy	 after	
discussing	 the	Formula	of	Universal	Law	 (FUL)	and	 the	Formula	of	
Humanity	(FH),	and	right	after	mentioning	a	third	formulation	of	the	





















In	other	words,	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	origin	of	 the	normative	
authority	of	the	principle	of	morality	lies	either	in	autonomy	or	in	het-
eronomy	is	based	on	the	disputable	presupposition	that	the	obligatory	




that	 Kant’s	Moral	 Law,	 as	 the	most	 fundamental	 practical	 principle,	
does	not	have	a	deeper	“ground”.	That	is	to	say,	what	remains	open	is	






son,	 this	at	once	gets	 rid	of	 the	difficulties	associated	with	 the	para-
doxical	 idea	 that	 the	principle	of	morality	 is	self-legislated.	 (We	will	



















is actually	 self-legislated	but	 that	 it	must	 be	viewed as	 self-legislated,	
that	one	must	regard	oneself	as	its	author,	and	that	one	must	act	as if 
one	were	giving	universal	law.	As	mentioned	above,	Wood	(2008,	111)	





































legislation”	by	 restating	 the	 third	practical	principle	as	 the	 “principle 
of	every	human	will	as a will that is universally legislating through all its 
maxims”	(G	4:432,	orig.	emphasis),	and	he	later	refers	to	this	principle	
as	“the	principle	of	autonomy”	(G	4:433).	The	fact	that	Kant	formulates	





native	 formulation,	 that	we	 regard	ourselves	 as	 giving	universal law 
“through	all	maxims”	of	our	will (see	G	4:433,	4:436–7).	
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Furthermore,	when	Kant	 calls	 the	Moral	Law	 the	principle	of	 au-
tonomy	(G	4:440),	he	presents	it	as	commanding	autonomy,	not	as	re-
sulting from	 it.	Since	our	will	 is	affected	by	sensible	 inclinations	that	
tempt	us	to	act	on	maxims	that	fail	to	meet	the	moral	requirement,	the	













2.2. The one Moral Law and the many moral laws










































13. Even if	 the	 law	 referred	 to	 in	 these	 two	passages	were	 the	Moral	Law,	 the	
phrase	 “being	 a	 law	 to	 itself”	would	not	 necessarily	 imply	 that	 this	 law	 is	
self-legislated.	This	phrase,	which	was	widely	used	in	philosophy	prior	to	Kant,	
echoes	Paul,	who	 says	of	 certain	heathens	 that	 they	 are	 “a	 law	unto	 them-
selves”	(Romans	2.14),	meaning	roughly	that	they	find	the	divine	command-
ments	within	 their	hearts	without	having	been	 instructed	by	divine	 revela-
tion	(thanks	to	Stefano	Bacin	for	making	us	aware	of	this,	see	Bacin	2013,	61).	












































when	discussing	autonomy	Kant	 typically	 speaks	of	 “moral	 laws”	 in	
the	plural.	For	example,	he	writes:	 “The	autonomy	of	 the	will	 is	 the	
sole	principle	of	all	moral	 laws	and	the	duties	 that	correspond	with	




















	 pauline	kleingeld	&	marcus	willaschek Autonomy Without Paradox
philosophers’	imprint	 –		9		–	 vol.	19,	no.	6	(february	2019)
2.4. Reason’s Grundgesetz for human beings
Thus	far,	we	have	considered	the	relevant	passages	from	the	Ground-















































Finally,	at	G	4:444	Kant	again	says	 that	 the	will	of	every	 rational	
being	 “imposes	 [a	 law]	 upon	 itself”,	 and	 here	 he	 seems	 to	 be	 refer-
ring	 to	 the	Moral	 Law.	 Kant	 is	 not	 using	 the	 vocabulary	 of	 “legisla-
tion”	in	this	passage,	however.	“Imposing	upon	itself”	is	not	the	same	
as	“self-legislating”,	and	it	may	well	be	understood	as	a	variant	of	the	
language	of	 “subjecting”	oneself	 to	 the	Moral	Law,	which	Kant	uses	
in	other	passages	(e.g.,	G 4:449).	In	the	quote	with	which	we	started	
this	 subsection	 (G	 4:440),	 Kant	 explicitly	 distinguishes	 subjection to 
a	 law	 from	 legislation.	Therefore,	 if	Kant	 is	asserting	 that	we	 impose	
the	Moral	Law	upon	ourselves	(or,	equivalently,	subject	ourselves	to	
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There	is	one	final	passage	from	the	Critique of Practical Reason that	
merits	discussion,	namely	the	(rather	dense)	passage	from	the	second	

























16.	 Thus,	he	writes	in	the	Metaphysics of Morals: “These	laws	of	freedom	are	called	
moral	laws,	to	distinguish	them	from	laws	of	nature.	To	the	extent	to	which	

























as	given,	 it	must	be	noted	carefully	 that	 it	 is	not	an	em-
pirical	fact	but	the	sole	fact	of	pure	reason,	which,	by	it,	




















process	of	 counterfactual	 reasoning,	 or	 a	 thought	 experiment.	 In	 the	































the	 idea	of	 autonomy	Kant	 formulates	a	 counterfactual	 criterion	 for	
determining	whether	maxims	 are	morally	 permissible	 and,	 through	
this,	for	articulating	substantive	moral	laws.	Since	this	criterion	is	an	
a	priori	principle	of	reason,	these	moral	laws	are	grounded	in	reason	
itself.	 In	 section	 4,	we	 spell	 out	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 reading	 for	
the	question	of	whether	Kant’s	moral	 theory	 is	best	 interpreted	as	a	
version	of	 realism	or	 constructivism.	Before	we	do	 so,	however,	we	
consider	 several	 possible	 problems	 associated	 with	 our	 alternative	
account.





3.1. Moral autonomy without paradox
First,	one	might	wonder	at	this	point	how	much	is	gained,	philosoph-







view	 discussing	 such	 a	 reading	 is	 unnecessary	 because	 Kant	 nowhere	 un-
equivocally	claims	that	the	Moral	Law	is	self-legislated	in	the	first	place.








or	 anything	 else,	 raises	 the	question	of	whether	Kant	 can	 allow	 for	
















to	 “consider”	 or	 “think	 of”	 them	 as	 given	 by	 God.	 Importantly,	 the	
thought	of	God	as	 legislator	 is	not	supposed	to	account	 for	 the	con-
tent	or	the	normative	validity	of	moral	laws.	As	Kant	puts	it,	God	must	
be	conceived	as	legislating	only	“genuine	duties”	—	that	is,	duties	that	
hold	 independently	of	 his	 legislation	 (Rel	 6:99).	Kant	 argues	 in	 the	
Powalski	Lectures	on	Practical	Philosophy	that	both	the	“principle	of	
morality”	and	the	moral	laws	are	“original”	and	“exist	in	and	of	them-





3.2. One obligation too many?
Second,	there	is	the	worry	that	our	reading	leads	to	what	we	might	call	
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A	 priori	 fundamental	 principles	 (Grundsätze)	 bear	 this	
name	not	merely	because	they	contain	in	themselves	the	
grounds	 of	 other	 judgments,	 but	 also	 because	 they	 are	
not	themselves	grounded	(gegründet)	in	higher	and	more	
general	cognitions.	(KrV	A148/B188)	
Such	 fundamental	 a	 priori	 principles	 cannot	 be	 proven	 by	 appeal	


















refers	to	it	as	the	a	priori	“principle	of	morality”	(Prinzip der Moralität, 
G	4:392;	Prinzip der Sittlichkeit,	G	4:410,	426,	432,	436,	440,	441,	445,	447,	












4. Beyond Realist and Constructivist Interpretations 











	 It	 is	 instructive	 to	 start	 by	 looking	 at	 other	 principles	 in	 Kant’s	
philosophical	system	that	have	the	status	of	fundamental,	underived	
a	priori	principles,	such	as	the	“supreme	principle	of	all	analytic	judg-
ments”	 (KrV	A150/B189;	 that	 is,	 the	 principle	 of	 non-contradiction),	















of	 reason”	 (KpV	5:31).	 In	 short,	 the	Moral	 Law	neither	 requires	nor	













son	can	be	 regarded	as	 legislating	 the	a	priori	moral	 laws,	with	 the	
Moral	Law	 functioning	as	 their	basic	principle	—	that	 is,	 as	 the	 “fun-
damental	law	(Grundgesetz)	of	a	supersensible	nature”	(KpV	5:42–6).	































rality	while	 abstracting	 entirely	 from	questions	 regarding	 its	 obliga-










Law	 “does	 not	 need	 any	 justifying	 grounds”,	 he	 continues,	 because	
we	are	“a	priori	conscious”	of	 it	 (KpV	5:47).	Kant	claims	that	human	









not	commit	one	 to	 the	view	that	we	receptively	become	aware	of	 it	
in	an	intuitive	or	quasi-intuitive	way.	Indeed,	Kant	says	that	we	are	“a	
























































21.	 For	 extended	 discussions	 of	 the	 debate	 between	 realist	 and	 constructivist	
readings	of	Kant’s	ethics,	see	Stern	2012	(from	a	more	realist	perspective)	and	
Rauscher	2015	(from	a	more	constructivist	perspective).
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